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Note
J.E.B. v. ALABAMA ex rel. T.B.: THE SUPREME COURT MOVES
CLOSER TO EIMINATION OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE
INTRODUCTION
InJE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors
solely on the basis of gender constitutes sex discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized race-based and gen-
der-based discrimination and held that the principles articulated in its
1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky3 must be applied in cases where
venirepersons are struck solely on the basis of their gender.4 The
JE.B. Court declared that peremptory challenges exercised on the ba-
sis of sex cannot withstand "heightened scrutiny."5
While applying a heightened scrutiny formula to reach this re-
sult,6 the Court focused, in dicta, on the history of discrimination
against women in the judicial process.7 The resulting opinion,
although ostensibly grounded in equal protection principles that ap-
ply with equal force to both sexes, seems to place the possible injury to
struck female venirepersons above other concerns, including the in-
terest of the striking litigant in obtaining a fair and impartial jury.'
1. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
2. Id. at 1422. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 reads in pertinent part,
"[n]o state ... shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to
eliminate African-American jurors violates the Equal Protection Clause).
4. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
5. Id. at 1425; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982);
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981). Justice Blackmun observed that the criti-
cal inquiry for the Court is whether discrimination on the basis of gender injury selection
substantially furthers the state's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial.
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
6. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425. "[G]ender-based classifications require 'an exceedingly
persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.... Thus, the only ques-
tion is whether discrimination on the basis of gender injury selection substantially furthers
the state's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial." Id. (quoting Person-
nel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
7. Id. at 1423.
8. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
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The underlying reasoning of J.E.B. contrasts sharply with that of
previous caselaw articulating a litigant's right to a jury drawn from a
"fair cross-section" of the community.9 The fair cross-section cases
had held the systematic exclusion of women from the venire unconsti-
tutional, precisely because the absence of the unique perspective of
women may well render a jury insufficiently representative of a fair
cross-section of the community as required by the Sixth Amend-
ment.10 J.E.B., however, declared it unconstitutional for the litigant to
acknowledge and act upon the reality that different life experiences of
men and women may lead to correspondingly different viewpoints.1"
The effect of the differing viewpoints of men and women would be
particularly important in cases that involve gender-sensitive issues,
such as rape, sexual harassment, and paternity.' 2 The majority in
J.E.B. carefully characterized its new rule as a prohibition merely
against using gender "as a proxy for bias."'" This statement, however,
ignores human nature and the possibility that, in some cases, bias may
be unavoidably related to gender.14
This Note argues that the Court's extension of Batson principles
to gender-based peremptory challenges has compromised the per-
emptory challenge to such a degree that it is no longer an effective
9. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537-38 (1975) (holding that the exclu-
sion of women from jury venires deprives a criminal defendant of the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community). See
also infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
10. In Taylor, the Court noted,
"The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclu-
sively of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle inter-
play of influence one on the other is among the imponderables. . . . The
exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the community
than would be true if an economic or racial group were excluded."
Id. at 531-32 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)).
11. JE.B., 114 S. CL at 1432 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
12. In 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized this reality in a
sexual harassment case when it chose to "analyze harassment from the victim's perspec-
tive." Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). The court stated:
A complete understanding of the victim's view requires, among other things, an
analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many
men consider unobjectionable may offend many women .... We realize that
there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we believe that
many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share. For
example, because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual as-
sault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior.
Id. at 878-79.
13. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
14. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence, "(T]o say that gender makes no
difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of
fact." JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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litigation tool. The challenge, "arbitrary and capricious" by design, 15
historically has provided litigants with a method for factoring non-
quantifiable elements of "human nature" into the jury selection pro-
cess.1 6 After J.E.B., the litigant's freedom to act on intuition or the
knowledge of differing male and female perspectives is severely ham-
pered. 7 While the Court has allowed the challenge to survive in a
technical sense,18 J.E.B. has imposed such a sweeping restraint upon
the exercise of the peremptory challenge that its demise appears
inevitable.
15. "The right of peremptory challenge 'is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capri-
cious right; and it must be exercised with full freed6m, or it fails of its full purpose.'"
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lamb v. State, 36 Wis. 424, 427
(1874)).
16. Former Chief Justice Burger observed:
The peremptory [challenge], made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking
in the core of truth in most common stereotypes .... Common human experi-
ence, common sense, psychosociological studies, and public opinion polls tell us
that it is likely that certain classes of people statistically have predispositions that
would make them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases. ... "[W] e
have evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expres-
sion of what we dare not say but know is true more often than not."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire:
Preserving Its Wonderful Power, 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 554 (1975)). The peremptory chal-
lenge, Burger noted, has "long been viewed as a means to achieve an impartial jury that
will be sympathetic toward neither an accused nor witnesses for the State on the basis of
some shared factor of race, religion, occupation, or other characteristic." Id. at 125. See
also Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does It Make: Gender and Juiy Selection, 2 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 67 (1992). Professor Forman notes that "[tihe peremptory challenge
gives litigants the opportunity to remove jurors whom they believe are likely to be biased,
without meeting the stringent requirements of challenges for cause." Id.
17. The peremptory challenge, in its original form, has been said to serve a variety of
objectives. Blackstone stated that the challenge served a dual purpose: to ensure a "de-
fendant had a 'good opinion' of his jury and to protect the defendant from trial by 'anyone
he intuitively disliked.'" See Forman, supra note 16, at 67 (quoting 2 WILIAM BLACKSTONE,
4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 346-47 (Katz ed. 1979)).
18. Justice Blackmun asserted that, "[ojur conclusion that litigants may not strike po-
tential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory
challenges. Neither does it conflict with a State's legitimate interest in using such chal-
lenges in its effort to secure a fair and impartial jury." JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. Here,
Justice Blackmun defends the holding against what he clearly recognized as inevitable criti-
cisms. He calls attention to the dual concerns thatJE.B will: (1) lead to the elimination
of the peremptory challenge; and (2) interfere with the state's interest in using the chal-
lenge-which is at least "legitimate" and may in fact be "substantial"-to secure a fair and
impartial jury. Id. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "the
state interest involved here has historically been regarded by this Court as substantial, if
not compelling"). Justice Blackmun's own recognition of these concerns, albeit in the
context of a denial of their validity, demonstrates that they are, at a minimum, implicated
by the ruling inJE.B. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
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I. THE CASE
In 1991, the State of Alabama, on behalf of T.B., the mother of a
minor child, filed a complaint for paternity and child support against
petitioner J.E.B. in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama. 9
The district court adjudicated paternity, and J.E.B. appealed to the
state circuit court where the case was tried on October 21, 1991.20 A
venire consisting of thirty-six potential jurors-twelve males and
twenty-four females-was assembled. From this pool of thirty-six po-
tential jurors, ajury was selected by the "struck jury" method pursuant
to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.21 Two men and one woman
were excused from the venire for cause, leaving ten male jurors
among the remaining thirty-three. 22 An all-female jury was selected
after the State used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to remove men,
and J.E.B. used all but one of his strikes against women.23
Before the jury was empaneled, J.E.B. objected to the State's per-
emptory challenges, contending that they were exercised against male
jurors solely on the basis of gender in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.24 J.E.B. urged that the principles of Batson, which prohib-
ited peremptory strikes exercised solely on the basis of race, similarly
forbid intentional discrimination on the basis of gender.25 The circuit
court, however, refused to apply Batson principles and empaneled the
all-female jury.26 This jury foundJ.E.B. to be the father of the child.2 '
On a post-judgment motion, the circuit court reaffirmed its ruling
that Batson principles did not apply to gender.28
Relying on Alabama precedent, the Alabama Court of Civil Ap-
peals affirmed.29 The appellate court rejectedJ.E.B.'s contention that
the trial court had erred in overruling his objection to the State's use
of peremptory strikes to eliminate men. ° The Supreme Court of Ala-
19. Id. at 1421.
20. J.E.B. v. State ex reL T.B., 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), revd, 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994). See also Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 2,JE.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (No.
92-1239).
21. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 2, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239) (citing ALA. R. Cry. P.
47).
22. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421-22.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. J.E.B. v. State exreL T.B., 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994).
30. Id. at 157 (citing Ex parte Murphy, 596 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1992)).
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bama denied certiorari.3 1 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari12 to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to whether the
Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of
gender.
3
II. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The JE.B. Court held that a litigant's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude persons from a petit jury on the basis of gender is
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 4 In so
ruling, the Court drew heavily on the history of discrimination against
women in the United States, particularly as manifested in the judicial
process.3 5 The Court pointed to an atmosphere of "'romantic pater-
nalism"' that had once placed women "'not on a pedestal, but in a
cage '  and decried the antique notion that women must be pro-
tected from the "polluted courtroom atmosphere."' Finally, the
Court noted the persistence of the judicial system's failure to "trans-
late its appreciation for the value of women's contribution to civic life
into an enforceable right to equal treatment under state laws gov-
erning jury service.""
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun explained that a
heightened scrutiny analysis" mandates the ruling that gender-based
31. ExparteJ.E.B., No. 1911717 (Ala. Oct. 23, 1992).
32. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
33. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 n.1. (1994). See, e.g., United
States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing trial court decision apply-
ing Batson to defendant's peremptory challenge of two female jurors); United States v.
DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433, 143743 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (extending Batson to prohibit
gender-based peremptory challenges in civil and criminal trials); United States v. Hamil-
ton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to extend Batson to gender and
accepting gender as a racially neutral explanation for a prosecutor's use of peremptory
strikes).
34. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
35. Id. at 1422-23.
36. Id. at 1423 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality
opinion)).
37. id.
38. Id. at 1424 (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61 (1961)).
39. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424. Justice Blackmun noted that since Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971), the Supreme Court "has subjected gender-based classifications to heightened
scrutiny in recognition of the real danger that government policies that professedly are
based on reasonable considerations in fact may be reflective of 'archaic and overbroad'
generalizations about gender.... ." Id.
See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In Hogan, the Court
explained the test applied in a "heightened scrutiny" analysis. Id. at 724-26. First, the
state's objective must be "legitimate and important." Id. Second, there must be a "direct,
substantial relationship" between the objective and the means used to achieve it. Id. See
infta notes 76, 77 and accompanying text.
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peremptory challenges, exercised by state actors,4 ° violate the Equal
Protection Clause.4" The J.E.B. Court grounded its reasoning in the
premise that discriminatory practices on the basis of race and gender
are, to a large extent, analogous. 42 The Court noted that, "with re-
spect to jury service, African-Americans and women share a history of
total exclusion."43 Any attempt to use peremptory challenges to ex-
clude jurors on the basis of gender stereotypes is, therefore, unconsti-
tutional unless the striking litigant establishes that "discrimination on
the basis of gender substantially furthers the State's legitimate interest
in achieving a fair and impartial trial."44 The Court, however, de-
clined to weigh the value of the peremptory challenge against its
stated policy goal of eradicating discrimination.45
The Court flatly rejected the respondent's argument that gender
may be a barometer of the attitudes of male or female jurors.46 The
Court stated that gender-based peremptory challenges cannot bejusti-
fied in light of the harm to the community, litigants, and individual
40. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. The term "state actor" has been inter-
preted broadly in post-Batson caselaw to include virtually all parties who enter the court-
house-including criminal defendants and civil litigants.
41. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424-25.
42. Id. at 1425.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1425 & n.6; accord Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26. See supra note 39 and accompa-
nying text; see also infra notes 76, 77 and accompanying text.
45. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425. "[W]e do not weigh the value of peremptory challenges
as an institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate invidious discrimination
from the courtroom. Instead, we consider whether peremptory challenges based on gen-
der stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial
jury." Id. at 1425-26. The Court took care to point out that while peremptory challenges
are regarded as valuable tools injury trials, they are not "'constitutionally protected funda-
mental rights.'" Id. at 1426 n.7 (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358
(1992)).
46. Id. at 1426-27. The respondent argued that its decision to strike males from the
jury
may reasonably have been based upon the perception, supported by history, that
men otherwise totally qualified to serve upon a jury might be more sympathetic
and receptive to the arguments of a man alleged in a paternity action to be the
father of an out-of-wedlock child, while women equally qualified to serve upon a
jury might be more sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of the com-
plaining witness who bore the child.
Id. at 1426 & n.9 (quoting Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 10, JE.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994) (No. 92-1239)).
The Court asserted that "the majority of studies suggest that gender plays no identifi-
able role in jurors' attitudes." Id. at 1426 n.9 (citing VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDmAR,
JUDGING THE JURY 76 (1986)). The Court refused to accept as a defense to gender-based
peremptory challenges "'the very stereotype the law condemns.'" Id. at 1426 & n.9 (quot-
ing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
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jurors that results from sex discrimination.47 In dicta, the majority
denied that its ruling implies "the elimination of all peremptory chal-
lenges,"4" or that the holding impairs the state's legitimate interest in
using peremptories to secure a fair and impartial jury.49 "Parties still
may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than
others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for
bias."50
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority, but wrote sepa-
rately to urge that the holding be limited to the government's use of
gender-based peremptory strikes.5' This position echoed her dissents
in previous case law that had extended the reach of Batson.5" Justice
O'Connor feared an adverse impact on litigants if Batson were so
sweepingly extended.5" Injustice O'Connor's view, the Court's deci-
sion not to "'tolerate prosecutors' racially discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge, in effect, is a special rule of relevance, a state-
ment about what this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of
fact."' 54 According to justice O'Connor, this rule, if extended beyond
those narrow boundaries to all other litigants, will impinge on "the
ability of litigants to act on sometimes accurate gender-based assump-
tions about juror attitudes."55
47. JE.B., 114 S. CL at 1427.
48. Id. at 1429.
49. Id.
50. Id. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted unease with the
Court's holding and commented that it "further erodes the role of the peremptory chal-
lenge." Id. Her concurrence points to the fundamental change brought about by the Bat-
son line of cases: "[A]s we add, layer by layer, additional constitutional restraints on the use
of the peremptory, we force lawyers to articulate what we know is often inarticulable. In so
doing, we make the peremptory challenge less discretionary and more like a challenge for
cause." Id.
52. Id. at 1432. Justice O'Connor resisted the extension of Batson principles to the use
of peremptory challenges by civil litigants in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 632 (1991); and by criminal defendants in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2361
(1992).
53. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433. Justice O'Connor observed that the majority, in its efforts
to protect female venirepersons, may have dealt a blow to female litigants:
Will we, in the name of fighting gender discrimination, hold that the battered
wife-on trial for wounding her abusive husband-is a state actor? Will we pre-
clude her from using her peremptory challenges to ensure that the jury of her
peers contains as many women members as possible? I assume we will, but I hope
we will not.
Id.
54. Id. at 1432 (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986)
(O'Connor, J, concurring in denial of certiorari)).
55. Id.
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Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but put forth a dif-
ferent view of the "perceived effect" of the decision.56 He expressed a
broader concern with courtroom discrimination, emphasizing that
the prohibition on racial and gender bias in jury selection extends to
deliberations.5" The juror, he stated, sits as an individual and not as a
representative of a racial or sexual group.58
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 9 and Justice
Thomas, dissented, criticizing the majority opinion as being irrelevant
to the case at hand.60 The dissenters were troubled by the conflict
between JE.B. and earlier Sixth Amendment "fair cross-section"
cases.6' Essentially applying a "harmless error" analysis, the dissenters
stated that if jurors are viewed as "fungible," the petitioner in J.E.B.
suffered no injury.6" The dissenters argued that by focusing unrealisti-
cally upon individual exercises of the challenge, and ignoring the "to-
tality of the practice," the Court had misapplied its equal protection
analysis.6" Because all groups are subject to the peremptory chal-
lenge, "it is hard to see how any group is denied equal protection."64
The dissenters argued, moreover, that the Court's holding invites in-
validation of all peremptory strikes based on any group characteris-
56. Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id. "Nothing would be more pernicious to the jury system than for society to pre-
sume that persons of different backgrounds go to the jury room to voice prejudice. The
jury pool must be representative of the community, but that is a structural mechanism for
preventing bias, not enfranchising it." Id. (citations omitted).
59. In a separate dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the view that "there are
sufficient differences between race and gender discrimination such that the principle of
Batson should not be extended to peremptory challenges to potential jurors based on sex."
JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Calling Batson a "sea-change" in
the jury selection process, Rehnquist asserted that Batson "'does not apply outside the
uniquely sensitive area of race.'" Id. at 1435 (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S.
940, 942 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
60. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Notwithstanding an often acerbic
tone, Justice Scalia argued that in dwelling so heavily on discrimination against women, the
majority was blinded to the fact that the system of peremptory challenges "as a whole is
even-handed. . . . [F]or every man struck by the government, petitioner's own lawyer
struck a woman." Id. at 1437.
61. Id. at 1436. "'Controlled studies.. . have concluded that women bring to juries
their own perspectives and values that influence both jury deliberation and result.'" Id.
(quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 & n.12 (1975)).
62. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437. Justice Scalia observed that if male and female jurors are
indistinguishable, then the only arguable injury resulting from the prosecutor's "impermis-
sible" use of male gender as the basis for peremptories is injury to the stricken juror, not
the defendant. Id. "Indeed, far from having suffered harm, petitioner, a state actor under
our precedents, has himself actually inflicted harm on female jurors." Id. (citations
omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
268
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tic.65 Finally, the dissenters asserted that the extension of Batson to
sex, "and almost certainly beyond," will provide the basis for extensive
"collateral" litigation.66
III. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. A "Cross-Section" of the Community
In the United States, the tradition of trial by jury in both criminal
and civil proceedings "contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community."6 7 The requirement that the venire
represent a "fair cross-section" was deemed fundamental by the
Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana.6" The Taylor Court held that
state laws resulting in the systematic exclusion of women from jury
service violated the fair cross-section requirement.6" In Taylor, and
later in Duren v. Missouri,70 the Court repudiated the notion that wo-
men could be exempted from jury duty based solely on their sex. Tay-
lor and Duren recognized that women are a "distinctive" group in the
community71 and that the systematic exclusion of them from jury
pools fundamentally alters the venire by eliminating the natural dy-
namic that occurs within heterogeneous groups.72
Taylor and Duren were decided against a backdrop of Supreme
Court precedent holding gender-based statutory classifications uncon-
65. Id. at 1438.
66. Id. at 1439. Justice Scalia warned that the judicial system as a whole will bear the
burden of the newly-expanded quest for "reasoned peremptories." Id. The criminal de-
fendant, who "litigates full-time and cost-free," can be expected to take advantage of the
fact that virtually "every case contains a potential sex-based claim" against peremptory chal-
lenges. Id.
67. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). See also U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
68. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating that the fair cross-section requirement is "funda-
mental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment"). See supra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 69, 71-72 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 535-37 (finding that special exemption from jury service for women operates
to exclude them from petit juries contrary to the command of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments). See supra note 68.
70. 439 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1979) (holding that petitioner's right to a trial by a jury
chosen from a fair cross-section of the community was prevented by a Missouri statute
granting women, upon request, an automatic exemption from jury service).
71. In Taylor, the Court observed that "women are sufficiently numerous and distinct
from men and that if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amend-
ment's fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied." Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531. See also
Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (establishing a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section require-
ment when the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community).
72. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531-32. See supra note 10.
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stitutional. Two cases, Reed v. Reed"3 and Frontiero v. Richardson,7 4 al-
ready had struck significant blows against sex discrimination by
declaring that statutes affording different treatment to similarly situ-
ated men and women violated the Equal Protection Clause. 75 Subse-
quently, the Court held in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan'6
that a gender-based statutory classification must be supported by an
"exceedingly persuasive justification." 7 Hogan's landmark holding es-
tablished an intermediate, or "heightened" level of scrutiny for gen-
der-based classifications that was invoked by the Court in JE.B.7a
B. Equal Protection Applied to Juy Selection
Long before the Court had begun to consider the issue of sex
discrimination, equal protection principles had been applied to racial
discrimination in jury selection. In 1880, the Supreme Court, in
Strauder v. West Virginia,79 struck down a state statute that permitted
73. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding an Idaho statute that gave preferential treatment to
men over women when persons of the same entitlement class apply for appointment as
administrator of a decedent's estate is violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
74. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding a federal statute that classified a spouse of a male
member of the armed forces as a dependent but a spouse of a female member as not
dependent unless he was dependent on his wife for over one half of his support amounts
to a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
75. While both Frontiero and Reed struck down gender-based classifications, the cases
appear to differ as to the standard applied. Reed is viewed as the first in a series of cases
establishing "heightened scrutiny" as the standard to be applied to gender classifications.
JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424-25. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the language that the
Reed Court used relied upon the less rigorous "rational basis" test. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. See
supra note 39. The question thus framed in Reed was, "whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration [bore] a rational relationship" to the
state objective that the particular classification seeks to advance. Id. By contrast, in Fron-
tiero, a plurality of the Court went much further and concluded "that classifications based
upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
688.
76. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding a state-supported university's limitation of enroll-
ment to women and denial of admission to qualified male applicants violates the Equal
Protection Clause). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979)). The Hogan Court stated that the burden can be met only by showing that "the
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" Id. (quoting
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
78. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
79. 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880). Because Strauder involved a state defendant, an Equal
Protection analysis was undertaken pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 305-06.
While the principles are the same, the analysis for cases involving federal defendants is
derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v.
DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). See generally U.S. CONST.
amend. V & amend. XIV, § 1.
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only white males to serve as jurors. Strauder remained the defining
precedent on racial discrimination injury selection until Swain v. Ala-
bama.8 0 Although Swain invalidated the systematic use of peremptory
challenges against African-Americans, the Court required the defend-
ant to show a pattern of discrimination against jurors of a particular
race.
8 1
Twenty-one years later, in Batson, the Court condemned this
"crippling burden of proof" and overruled Swain's principal hold-
ing.8" Under Batson, a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the petit jury
based on the facts of the case alone.83
In Batson, the Court shifted from a Sixth Amendment, "fair cross-
section," argument to a purely equal protection analysis.8 4 The peti-
tioner, in fact, brought his appeal under the Sixth Amendment and
"expressly declined to raise" an equal protection argument.85 But by
80. 380 U.S. 202, 226 (1965) (holding complainants bear the burden of proving the
alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges).
81. Id. at 227. The Swain Court declined to scrutinize the actions of a prosecutor in a
particular case, finding that "the presumption in any particular case must be that the pros-
ecutor is using the state challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury." Id. at 221-22.
Under the holding in Swain, a defendant could not make a prima facie showing of pur-
poseful racial discrimination by relying solely on the facts of the case alone. Batson, 476
U.S. at 92.
82. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
83. To establish a prima facie case in a Batson analysis,
the [aggrieved party] first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is enti-
fled to rely on the fact... that peremptory challenges constitute ajury selection
practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."
Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [peremptory challenges] to
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race .... This
combination of factors in the empaneling of a petit jury raises... the necessary
inference of purposeful discrimination.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (citations omitted). See also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
358-59 (1991) (plurality opinion) (noting proof of racially discriminatory intent or pur-
pose underlying the use of peremptory challenges is required in order to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause).
84. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4. The Court observed:
[T] he State has insisted that petitioner is claiming a denial of equal protection
and that we must reconsider Swain to find a constitutional violation on this rec-
ord. We agree with the State that resolution of petitioner's claim properly turns
on application of equal protection principles and express no view on the merits
of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments.
Id.
85. 1d. at 112 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). There was disagreement among the justices as
to whether the Court had authority to undertake such an analysis in view of the petitioner's
failure to raise the equal protection argument. Id. at 115. Chief Justice Burger rejected
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taking the latter approach, the Batson Court pitted the litigant's rights
to a fair and impartial jury, paramount under the Sixth Amendment,
against the rights of the excluded venireperson and the community's
interest in eradicating discrimination.86 As Professor Barbara A. Bab-
cock has observed, "[t]he goal of protecting those summoned to
serve, once a background feature, . . .moved to the center of the
analysis."87 With its application of equal protection rather than Sixth
Amendment principles, the Court demonstrated a heightened inter-
est in the rights of the excluded jurors themselves.88 As this concern
moved to the forefront, the usefulness of the peremptory challenge in
securing a fair and impartial jury receded in importance.89
Since 1986, the Court has extended Batson's reach. In Powers v.
Ohio,9" it held that a criminal defendant may object to a prosecutor's
race-based exclusion of persons from a petit jury regardless of whether
the defendant and the excluded jurors are of the same race.91 In Ed-
monson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,9 2 Batson was extended to civil litigants. 93
Finally, in Georgia v. McCollum,94 the Court concluded that for pur-
poses of exercising peremptory challenges a criminal defendant is a
state actor and, thus, is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of
race.
9 5
Justice Stevens' view that the issue was properly before the Court because the state "'has
explicitly rested on the issue in question as a controlling basis for affirmance.'" Id. at 116
(quoting Stevens, J., concurring, at 109).
86. Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights andJuly Service, 61 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1139, 1152-56 (1993).
87. Id. at 1142.
88. Id. ("[A] Ithough the Batson cases originated in concern for the rights of the black
[defendant], they have, from the beginning, also dealt with harm inflicted on the excluded
jurors."). See also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). The Powers Court devoted a major
portion of its analysis to whether a defendant in a criminal trial, regardless of his race, has
third-party standing to raise the equal protection claims ofjurors excluded by the prosecu-
tion because of their race. Id. at 410-16. Answering in the affirmative, the Court noted
that barring the petitioner's claim "because his race differs from that of the excluded ju-
rors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and
privilege ofjury service." Id. at 415.
89. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
90. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
91. Id. at 409-16.
92. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
93. Id. at 620-28. Edmonson held that civil litigants are "state actors" for purposes of
exercising peremptory challenges. Id.
94. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
95. Id. at 2359. Justice O'Connor, uneasy with the Court's willingness to expand Bat-
son, dissented. Id. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She deemed it a "remarkable" con-
clusion that "criminal defendants being prosecuted by the State act on behalf of their
adversary when they exercise peremptory challenges." Id. Justice Scalia, using stronger
language, called it "terminally absurd" to hold that a criminal defendant, defending him-
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Although confined to the issue of race, Batson and its progeny
spawned considerable uncertainty with respect to gender.96 Litigants,
sensing opportunity, began to attack gender-based challenges, while
commentators argued for the application of Batson to gender.97 The
result was a confusing and conflicting sequence of federal and state
court decisions on the extension of Batson to gender-based peremp-
tory challenges.9"
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Juror's Right to be Included
In J.E.B., the Court held that intentional, gender-based discrimi-
nation by state actors in the use of peremptory challenges violates the
Equal Protection Clause, particularly where it perpetuates stereotypes
about the respective abilities of males and females.99 All persons,
when granted the opportunity to serve on ajury, "have the right not to
be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical
self against the state, is also acting on behalf of the state. Id. at 2364 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Even allowing for the proposition that McCollum's holding follows logically from Edmonson,
Justice Scalia suggested that "a bad decision should not be followed logically to its illogical
conclusion." Id. at 2365.
96. The issue of whether Batson principles should apply to gender-based strikes had
centered largely around the question of whether gender- and race-based peremptories are
qualitatively the same. See supra note 59. Opponents of extending Batson to gender have
argued that gender-based strikes are fundamentally different from those exercised on the
basis of race. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434-35. ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued in his
dissent in JE.B. that assuming Batson was "correctly decided, there are sufficient differ-
ences between race and gender discrimination such that the principles of Batson should
not be extended to peremptory challenges to potential jurors on the basis of sex." Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
97. See generally Babcock, supra note 86, at 1151-74 (arguing for an extension of Batson
to gender-based peremptory challenges and discussing the shift in analysis of the Batson
line of cases from the Sixth Amendment's "fair cross-section" requirement to equal
protection).
98. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the conflict of authority that had arisen among
the federal circuits. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 596 So. 2d 42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (refus-
ing to extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 596 So. 2d 45 (Ala.), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
86 (1992); Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (extending Batson to
gender); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990) (finding gender-based peremptory
challenge to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution); Tyler
v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993) (holding that state constitution mandates extension of
Batson to gender); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989) (refusing to extend Batson
to gender); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987) (refusing to extend Batson to gen-
der). See generallyJE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421 n.1.
99. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
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presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical
discrimination."'00
While striving to eliminate this discrimination, the Court may
have dealt a fatal blow to the peremptory challenge, despite its protes-
tations to the contrary. '01 The Court has articulated a laudable goal
of public policy: eradicating sex discrimination.'0 2 Yet, somewhat dis-
ingenuously, it refused to acknowledge what it sacrificed in order to
achieve that purpose.'0 3 Justice Blackmun insisted that the majority
did not "weigh the value of peremptory challenges. ' 1 4 But, as evi-
denced by its own language, this is exactly what the Court did. The
Court stated that a policy that permits litigants to consider potentially
different "male" or "female" attitudes in their selection of a petit jury
is unjustifiable in light of the harm that discrimination causes to the
community, litigants, and individual jurors.10'5 Notwithstanding such
a disclaimer, this is a weighing.'0 6 The J.E.B. majority simply decided
that the objective of eliminating discrimination outweighs the impor-
tance of the peremptory challenge.10 7 Having made this choice, the
majority was unwilling to acknowledge the ramifications: the peremp-
tory challenge essentially has collapsed into a challenge for cause.'0 8
That the peremptory challenge cannot survive in the wake of
J.E.B. is readily apparent. 10 9 "' [T]he essential nature of the peremp-
100. Id. at 1428. The Court noted that "the right to nondiscriminatory jury selection
procedures belongs to the potential jurors as well as to the litigants.... The exclusion of
even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confi-
dence in the fairness of the system." Id. n.13.
101. Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1428.
103. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, made exactly this point:
Today's decision is a statement that, in an effort to eliminate the potential dis-
criminatory use of the peremptory, gender is now governed by the special rule of
relevance formerly reserved for race. Though we gain much from this statement,
we cannot ignore what we lose. In extending Batson to gender we have added an
additional burden to the state and federal trial process, [and] taken a step closer
to eliminating the peremptory challenge.
JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 1425. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 1427.
106. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
107. The Court specifically noted that while peremptory challenges are valuable tools in
jury trials, they are not constitutionally protected rights. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 n.7.
Clearly, the Court is comparing the relative importance of the challenge, which is not
subject to any constitutional protection, with the constitutionally guaranteed right to equal
protection of the laws. Id. at 1426.
108. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. It has been argued that the peremptory was doomed from the moment Batson was
decided. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Powers, commented that peremptories based on "sex,
religion, age, economic status, and any other personal characteristic unrelated to the ca-
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tory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, with-
out inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."'110 The
Court consistently has affirmed that the peremptory occupies "an im-
portant position in our trial procedures." ' ' That interest now will be
frustrated by extending Batson to gender, since one inevitable result of
J.E.B. is the fact that every venireperson now may claim status as a
member of a protected "group," merely by virtue of being male or
female." 12 Hence, counsel may be required to provide "an explana-
tion for every strike."
113
In light of this severe limitation on the usage of the peremptory,
its evisceration seems certain. 114 Justice Scalia, dissenting in Powers v.
Ohio, explained why this outcome is undesirable: "The peremptory
challenge system has endured so long because it has unquestionable
advantages.""' Those advantages include that the challenge is a criti-
cal "means of winnowing out possible (though not demonstrable)
sympathies and antagonisms on both sides, to the end that the jury
will be the fairest possible." 1 ' This winnowing process is particularly
important within the context of the criminal law system where a single
biased juror can prevent either conviction or acquittal.1 7 The advan-
tages of the peremptory challenge were previously set forth in Swain v.
Alabama in which the Court discussed the "essential nature" of the
challenge and the advantages thereof: "While challenges for cause
pacity for reasonable jury service ... are arguably within the logic" of Batson. Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 430 (1991).
Moreover, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurrence to JE.B., a "special
rule of relevance" traditionally has been reserved for race, setting it apart from gender.
JE.B., 114 S. CL at 1432 (O'ConnorJ, concurring). See supra notes 54-55 and accompany-
ing text. See also United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Batson is a
prophylactic device reached for in response to demonstrated need.").
110. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 220 (1964)).
111. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
112. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Broussard, 987 F.2d at 219. See also Thomas v. State, No. 1921804, 1994 Ala. LEXIS
446, at *21-22 (Ala. Sept. 2, 1994) (Houston, J., concurring). Judge Houston stated:
In spite of the weak attempt by the majority injE.B to assure thatJ.E.B. does not
eliminate all peremptory challenges, I read JE.B. as requiring a nongender,
nonrace reason for striking any juror that is struck, and as requiring no prima
facie showing of gender (sex) or racial discrimination before a disclosure of rea-
son is required. Therefore, there is no more peremptory challenge.
Id.
114. See supra note 109.
115. Powers, 499 U.S. at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Id. Justice Scalia stated that the peremptory challenge frequently serves the pur-
pose of enabling a litigant to strike a potentially undesirable juror on the basis of personal
characteristics that would not provide a basis for exercising a challenge for cause. Id.
117. Id.
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permit rejection ofjurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally
cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a
real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or
demonstrable."' 
18
B. Conflict With Precedent
ThatJE.B. apparently has dealt a lethal blow to the time-honored
peremptory challenge is troubling.119 It is all the more discomforting
because the Court employed reasoning that cannot be reconciled with
previous case law articulating the unique characteristics of the gen-
ders and the resultant need to include both in the venire. 12 ° As the
JE.B. dissenters pointed out, the majority's analysis "seems to place
the Court in opposition to its earlier 'fair cross-section' cases."1 2 ' The
logic of JE.B. dictates that men and women must be viewed as indis-
tinguishable; no acknowledgement may be made of their potentially
different perspectives.
122
In its zeal to purge the judicial system of discrimination, theJE.B.
Court has failed to account for human nature. It summarily rejected
the respondent's argument, grounded in common sense and experi-
ence, that males and females may think and react differently in re-
sponse to gender-sensitive issues. 123 Incongruously, the Court cited to
language in Taylor that recognizes that a "distinct quality" is lost if
either sex is excluded from the venire. 124 Justice Blackmun invoked
118. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. The Swain Court further observed that the peremptory
challenge often is "exercised upon the 'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices
we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another,' upon a juror's 'habits
and associations,' or upon the feeling that 'the bare questioning [of ajuror's] indifference
may sometimes provoke a resentment.'" Id. (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,
376 (1892)); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). It should be noted that while the
Batson Court overruled Swain to the extent that Swain imposed upon the petitioner the
burden of proving the systematic discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the Batson
Court did not take issue with Swain's characterization of the advantages of the challenge.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 91.
119. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 9-10, 68-69, 71-72 and accompanying text.
121. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See supra note
61.
122. Id.
123. The Court tersely paraphrased Powers: "We shall not accept as a defense to gender-
based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'" Id. at 1426 (quoting
Powers, 499 U.S. at 410). This response ignores reality and fails to refute the respondent's
position.
124. Justice Blackmun, recounting the evolution of judicial attitudes toward women,
cited Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), as the case that "first questioned the
fundamental fairness of denying women the right to serve on juries." JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at
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the fair cross-section cases 125 when he asserted that the jury's "diverse
and representative character ... must be maintained," 126 but he failed
to acknowledge why that cross-section must include women in order
to be fair. None of the cases relied upon by the majority stand for the
proposition that all potential jurors can, or should, be regarded as
identical-quite the contrary is true. Taylor and Duren both dealt with
systematic, institutionalized exclusion of women from jury service, and
both cases stressed that a fair cross-section is impossible to achieve if
women are excluded, precisely because women are a "distinct" group
within the community.'27 "[W]omen bring to juries their own per-
spectives and values that influence both jury deliberation and
result."1
28
C. Application ofj.E.B.
In the brief period since the Court's decision in JE.B., its ruling
has been cited frequently in lower state and federal courts. 129 Perhaps
the most intriguing treatment ofJE.B. occurred in the Court's denial
of certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota. 3 Petitioner Davis, an African-
American, argued after his conviction for aggravated robbery that the
prosecutor's "race-neutral" reason for striking a black juror-the juror
and Davis were both Jehovah's Witnesses-violated equal protection
principles under Batson.' While the Court did not articulate a rea-
son for its denial of certiorari,Justice Thomas,joined by Justice Scalia,
dissented, arguing that the Supreme Court of Minnesota's affirmance
of the conviction should have been vacated, and the case remanded to
the trial court in light of J.E.B.'32 The dissenters noted that the Min-
nesota court affirmed Davis prior to JE.B. and relied on the notion
that Batson principles applied exclusively to racially discriminatory
peremptory strikes.13 Justice Thomas suggested that the Supreme
1424. YetJustice Blackmun also recognized that the Ballard Court rejected the notion that
"women have no superior or unique perspective." Id.
125. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). See supra notes 9-10, 67-72 and accompa-
nying text.
126. JEB., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
127. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
128. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532 n.12 (citations omitted).
129. A computer-assisted search revealed at least 62 citations toJE.B. only four months
after the case was decided.
130. 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
131. Id. at 2121.
132. Id. (ThomasJ., dissenting).
133. Id. Justice Thomas found it difficult to understand the Supreme Court's unwilling-
ness to remand, in light ofJE.B., which, he said, "shatters the Supreme Court of Minne-
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Court, in "breaking the barrier" between classifications that merit
strict equal protection scrutiny and those that merit heightened scru-
tiny, has "extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes
based on the latter category of classifications-a category which, pre-
sumably, would include classifications based on religion."' 4 Justice
Thomas concluded that the Court's denial of certiorari "stems from
an unwillingness to confront forthrightly the ramifications of the deci-
sion in J.E.B. ""
As of the date of this writing, post-J.E.B. lower court decisions
have not shed light on the "ramifications" referred to by Justice
Thomas. Lower courts have yet to rule on whether Batson principles
must now extend to other "protected" classifications, such as religion.
To the extent the lower courts have applied J.E.B., they have done so
in a straightforward manner, engaging in little analysis of the long-
term impact of its holding.'36 The breadth and unequivocal sweep of
the Supreme Court's holding in JE.B. recently was acknowledged by
the Appellate Court of Connecticut, which noted that the language of
the JE.B. majority leaves little doubt that its principles will be applied
to the parties in a civil action in which the government is not involved.
sota's understanding that Batson's equal protection analysis applies solely to racially based
peremptory strikes." Id.
134. Id. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the Court held that a state statute
granting preferences to certain religious denominations should be regarded as "suspect"
and treated with strict scrutiny. Id. at 245-46. Justice Thomas's argument suggests that
heightened scrutiny should be the minimum standard that will be applied to classifications
based on a person's religion, thus bringing peremptory challenges based on religion well
within the ambit of J.E.B. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2121.
135. Id. Justice Thomas further asserted,
Once the scope of the logic in J.E.B. is honestly acknowledged, it cannot be glibly
asserted that the decision has no implications for peremptory strikes based on
classifications other than sex, or that it does not imply further restrictions on the
exercise of the peremptory strike outside the context of race and sex.
Id.
136. See, e.g., Abshire v. State, No. 81,326, 1994 Fla. LEXIS 997, at *5 (Fla. June 30,
1994). The Supreme Court of Florida remanded Abshire in light of JE.B. and observed
[The] Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the
basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a partic-
ular case for no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a wo-
man or happens to be a man. As with race, the "core guarantee of equal
protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate .... would be
meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such as-
sumptions, which arise solely from the juror's [gender]."
Id. (citing JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430). See also Tennessee v. Turner, 879 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn.
1994) (affirming, in light of JE.B., trial court's refusal to allow criminal defendant to use
peremptory strikes to remove females from venire and emphasizing individual juror's right
to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures); In re Codey, No. 93-0083, 1994 Wis. App.
LEXIS 902, at *9 (Wis. Ct. App.July 27, 1994) (remanding matter to trial court on the basis
of JE.B. and noting "J.E.B. extends Batson to peremptory strikes based on gender.").
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Individual jurors have the right to nondiscriminatory jury se-
lection procedures. Because discrimination based on gender
is prohibited and potential jurors as well as litigants must re-
ceive the protection of that right, the right must logically re-
main unmodified and intact regardless of the identity of the
litigants. We, therefore, conclude thatJ.E.B applies to cases
such as this one, in which the government is not a litigant.s 7
CONCLUSION
J.E.B. resolved the debate over the constitutionality of gender-
based peremptory challenges, declaring such challenges invalid. The
case highlights, however, the tension that Batson and its progeny have
created between two competing concerns. The first is the right of the
litigant to attain an impartial jury. 3 ' The second concern rests upon
the state's obligation to shield the juror from racial and gender dis-
crimination. 3 While it is not difficult to reconcile the peremptory
challenge with the first goal, the Court has decided that the challenge
squarely conflicts with the second. In JE.B., the Court decided that
the challenge-and quite possibly future litigants-must lose.
SUSAN A. WINCHURCH
137. Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 645 A.2d 557, 566 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert.
denied, 231 Conn. 915 (1994). In Martins, the court further observed that JE.B, limits a
litigant's right, enumerated specifically in the Connecticut constitution, to peremptorily
challenge potential jurors. Id. at 565.
Thus, while Connecticut litigants still have a state constitutional right to use per-
emptory challenges, the extent of that use is now limited by the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution as enunciated in the JE.B, decision, as poten-
tial jurors may no longer be peremptorily challenged on the basis of gender.
Id.
138. See generally JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (discussing the state's "legitimate interest in
achieving a fair and impartial trial"). See also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 ("All persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on a
jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypi-
cal presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination."). See also
Babcock, supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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